Boutique audits.AI-assisted, human-verified.

Five real exploits replay in turn: each contract types itself, the scan flags the flaw, and a note says what it cost and how it is fixed.

• The DAO, 2016-06-17: 3.6M ETH drained. splitDAO paid the reward through an external call before it zeroed the balance, so the attacker re-entered and split the same tokens again and again. Zero the balance before any external call.
• Parity Multisig, 2017-11-06: 513,774 ETH frozen. The shared library was never initialized, so anyone could call initWallet on it, become its owner and kill it. Every wallet that delegated to it froze. Initialize the library at deploy, and give it no self-destruct.
• Wormhole, 2022-02-02: 120,000 wETH, ~$325M. verify_signatures read the signature check from an account the caller chose, and never confirmed it was the instructions sysvar. A fake one passed as a full guardian approval. Use load_instruction_at_checked, which verifies the sysvar address.
• Nomad Bridge, 2022-08-01: ~$190M drained. An upgrade set the trusted root to 0x00. An unproven message maps to 0x00, so process accepted any message, and hundreds of copycats replayed the first one. Never confirm the zero root, and refuse a message that was never proven.
• Euler Finance, 2023-03-13: ~$197M drained. donateToReserves burned eTokens without checking the donor stayed solvent. The attacker donated into bad debt, then liquidated itself at a discount. Check liquidity after the donation, as other withdrawals do.